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Abstract—Autonomous cyber physical systems are increasingly
common in a wide variety of application domains, with a
correspondingly wide range of functionalities and types of sensing
and actuation. At the same time, the variety and frequency of
cyber attacks is increasing in correspondence with the increasing
popularity and functionality of these systems, from in-vehicle
driver assistance to smart city infrastructure and robotics. These
technologies rely on a variety of sensors, actuating nodes and
control communications. Each sensor adds context by which the
autonomous system can better understand its environment, but
each sensor also provides opportunities for attack, as has been
observed in a variety of attacks on different systems. In this paper,
we introduce a model to observe signal characteristics, including
noise level patterns, on sensor data streams and incorporate
this information to differentiate between normal or abnormal
behaviour of a robotic vehicle. This model forms the basis of
an automated threat detection scheme, which we test using a
purpose-built testbed. Experiments are conducted in a controlled
environment using stochastic elements to introduce certain levels
of randomness during the experiment. The results indicate that
the system is able to distinguish the behaviour of a robotic vehicle
under different levels of environmental volatility and is able to
identify a sensory channel attack against it.
Keywords–Anomaly detection; Autonomous behaviour; Threat;
Cyber-Security; Signature.
I. INTRODUCTION
Detection of cyber threats is an expanding area of study in
the embedded systems domain. The need for cyber security
has increased significantly and there are many researchers
currently working towards cyber-physical security of such
systems, such as the decision tree-based approach in [1] using
decision trees for anomaly detection, and the behaviour rule
specification in [2]. In this paper, we evaluate our robotic
testbed system behaviour by monitoring components with
instrumentation installed on the system.
Several different attack vectors can apply to cyber-physical
systems. We divide these into cyber-physical and physical-
cyber. Cyber-physical attacks are attacks in cyberspace that
adversely affect the physical space. For instance, an attacker
can target the communication between the system and the
operator to disrupt normal system operation. In an autonomous
system, a system’s own autonomy can be used against it to
take over control over the autonomous system. Conversely,
physical-cyber attacks are the ones performed in physical space
to adversely affect cyberspace [3]. A trivial example would be
physical damage that would make the network unavailable. A
non-trivial example would be an attack consisting of custom
laser beams targeting an autonomous vehicle’s LiDAR [4], or
externally generated noise targeting ultrasonic sensors so as
to confuse the vehicle’s spatial awareness. Such attacks that
manipulate the input to sensor systems with the purpose to
affect the operation of a system that depends on them are often
referred to as sensory channel attacks.
Previously, there had been little or no consideration for
cyber security during the design of safety-critical systems,
but this is changing since the practical cyber-physical attacks
against vehicles were showcased for the first time a few years
ago [5][6]. Ten years ago, the threat level was significantly
lower, but now with the availability of electronic devices
such as Arduino kits, a variety of sensors that can be used
for educational purposes, consumer products and industrial
applications are wide spread. With increasing knowledge in
this area the threat to such systems increases. An attacker may
not necessarily have the intention of disrupting the system;
motives can vary and the outcomes can range from small value
fluctuations to possible lethal injuries [7]. This shows that there
is a need to secure cyber-physical systems.
In this paper, we focus on robotic vehicles, but we believe
that our model can be extended for use in unmanned aerial
vehicles, other cyber-physical systems where erratic sensing
can be the target or an indicator of a sensory channel attack.
In Section I-A, a reader will find the discussion on the current
state of a research in the cyber-security domain for robotic
vehicles. Later in Section II robotic vehicle testbed design is
discussed in detail covering its functionality, design specifics
and the experiment environment discussed in Section III. The
behaviour profile that we use in our methodology is discussed
in Section IV, explaining how sensor unique characteristics
are formed for the behavioural profile and its format. The
methodology itself is explained in Section V using readings
from a single data source during an attack. Overall (using all
data sources) the robotic testbed methodology performance
is discussed in Section VI, followed by the methodology
evaluation and conclusion in Section VII.
A. Related Work
Previous research in cyber attack resilience for such sys-
tems, has focussed on detection using a variety of techniques
such as anomaly detection based on rule specification[7] where
state is being defined using pre-defined system functionality.
The approach by Vuong et al. [1] shows that it is highly
beneficial to monitor not only cyber but also physical metrics
to identify cyber attacks [8], for instance to reduce the false
positive rate of detection [9]. Various voting algorithms [2]
where system nodes are interacting with each other to identify
an attack based on behaviour rule specifications have also
been proposed. A similar approach has been used by [10]
where robotic multi-agents have a reputation based on their
observations and try to reach consensus regarding misbehaving
robotic agents. Most researchers agree that a cyber-physical
system’s security has to be improved at the design stage, and
for this reason propose the use of more secure communication
[11] or the integration of gateway firewalls [6].
Another point of view is to evaluate mission success threats
based on the risk of a failure. For instance, Orojloo et al.
have developed a method for evaluation of the security of
cyber-physical systems [12] by evaluating the mean time to
system security failure with regards to system components
and different types of cyber-attacks. Majed et al. [13] have
proposed a framework for evaluating cyber threat exposure for
energy smart-grids by using attack trees and attack-graphs. A
variety of reliability [14] and survivability [15] models have
also been proposed for cyber threat evaluation.
Yampolskiy et al. proposed a language describing attacks
on cyber-physical systems [16]. This language would enable
the impact of certain attacks applicable to specific systems
to be described. When it comes to threat analysis, there is
little research done on quantification of threats. One example
from Sandia National Laboratories [17] uses a threat driven
approach for cyber security evaluation of organisations. Some
aspects of their findings can be taken into account when
a cyber-physical system is evaluated. The majority of these
approaches and frameworks take into account an attack based
on methods, conditions and impacts.
In most research presented above, researchers have taken
into account attack characteristics as input to identify anoma-
lous behaviour. In other words, the type of attack is pre-
defined. Our view is that this limits the practicality and likely
effectiveness of a protection mechanism to attacks that have
already occurred and are known to the system at hand. Here,
we attempt to detect attacks on which we have not already
trained our system. Our proposal is to monitor sensor noise
data accompanied with a system’s knowledge about itself, as
input for anomaly detection and to evaluate a possible threat to
the system. Such approach will treat attacks as generic entities,
therefore introducing dynamic anomaly detection approach,
which will continue being applicable as new attack vectors are
introduced and the sophistication (and/or number) of attacks
increases over time.
II. ROBOTIC TESTBED SYSTEM DESIGN
To facilitate detailed investigation of autonomous tech-
niques to detect cyber-physical attacks, we have built a
richly-instrumented robotic vehicle testbed which is shown
in Figure 3, with a variety of different sensor types. The
control system of the testbed comprises an integrated set of
modular embedded systems. It uses a variety of communication
protocols that are used in the industry, such as CAN, RS-
485, WiFi and ZigBee. This system was intentionally built
integrating technologies that are used by the industry so as
to be representative of a large subset of deployed systems.
We conduct a variety of real-world relevant experiments and
evaluate the system within the cyber security domain.
TABLE I. ROBOTIC TESTBED INSTALLED EQUIPMENT
Feature Purpose
CAN bus Internal communication
ZigBee External communication
WiFi Media streaming
Compass Bearing Navigation correction
DC Motors Movement
Ultrasonic Rangers Collision avoidance
System components produce signals and feedback that is
used by other system components to change overall system
behaviour. Several components that are mentioned in Table
I produce instrumentation data which is used as cyber or
physical domain indicators. The combination of such indicators
can produce additional meta-data that can be used to identify
a particular behaviour of a system, as we describe later. All
sensor data is generalised and is treated as a data source. Pro-
cessing is distributed across the various embedded processors
on the testbed platform.
One type of processing node is an AVR-CAN development
board, several of which are used to host specific sensors. If
such a node is responsible for navigational tasks, the node will
listen for data sources with related data and act appropriately.
A variety of sensing or actuating components share their
processing node. For instance, a single node is responsible for
processing bearing, pitch and roll sensors. Overall the system
contains six processing nodes, five of which are AVR-CAN
development boards clocked at 16 MHz, and one STK300
Kanda board powered by Atmel ATMega1281 chip clocked
at 8 MHz.
System components allow the robotic vehicle testbed to
undertake a variety of autonomic tasks, such as navigation
based on the logical mission layer that represents a sequence of
steps given to the testbed. Sensors allow the vehicle to navigate
autonomously in an environment using the compass bearing
to keep track of the direction, ultrasonic rangers for collision
detection and avoidance, and pitch and roll sensors to make
direction corrections and inform the system of environment
volatility. Also, the system uses an informative meta-data
sensor that measures the temperature of the heat sink connected
to the on-board voltage regulators which supply power for the
camera and robotic arm. In this way, the system is able to
determine if these heavy-current-drawing system components
are in use. These sensors and additional meta-data extraction
allow automatic characterisation of the behaviour of a robotic
testbed vehicle whilst in operation.
Figure 1. High-level communication
To gather the data for off-line analysis, we use an external
workstation. Sensor data from the testbed is collected and
stored in a knowledge base. Communication between the
workstation and the robotic testbed vehicle is achieved using
a dedicated ZigBee network. The ZigBee connection also
enables us to transmit commands to the testbed (e.g. to initiate
missions). The camera is a self-contained unit; its audio and
video feeds are streamed using a standard WiFi protocol. An
overview of high-level communication architecture between
workstation and robotic testbed vehicle can be seen in Figure
1.
A variety of commands can be sent to the robotic vehi-
cle as simple navigation commands, camera or robotic arm
control commands. Additionally, the vehicle supports complex
mission task uploads. The command transmission is one-way
communication functionality; commands are only executed if
they are received from verified ZigBee network nodes and the
command is in the correct format. The robotic vehicle testbed
does not send any commands to any external nodes within
the ZigBee network. The testbed will only periodically report
its instrumentation data to a verified connected workstation.
The instrumentation report periodicity is one second, due to
the low bandwidth ZigBee protocol and unique ZigBee ZE10
module behaviour. Therefore higher-rate sample aggregation is
performed on-platform on the sensor hosting nodes.
Figure 2. Internal Communication: gateways connect different subsystems
For communication between system components, the
testbed uses a CAN bus. This bus is used to share overall
sensor data from data sources, including additional meta-
data extracted during data analysis by the processing nodes.
Internal communication architecture is shown in Figure 2. This
data is retransmitted to other nodes through gateways and is
collected at the reporting node which will transmit data to the
workstation when appropriate.
The software structure of the robotic vehicle testbed uses
a layered architecture, which separates the different levels of
reasoning from the lowest physical sensor level, represented
by individual embedded nodes performing analog to digital
conversions interpreting signals into an understandable soft-
ware language. The next-higher level is the classification layer
where data is analysed using statistical analysis approaches,
such as exponential smoothing to determine the trends in the
data. A level higher, we have an autonomous module controller
layer which controls actuating capabilities based on the data
received from the lower layers of the model. The autonomic
module controller layer is a set of autonomic controllers
that are carrying out their defined tasks, such as robotic
arm movement or navigational control. A mission layer then
collects knowledge from autonomic controllers and evaluates
if the expected mission goal has been achieved. The layered
software approach improves flexibility and maintainability in
terms of a robotic vehicle testbed programming, as all these
layers are implemented as a set of libraries that can be extended
further.
In a real-world environment, there are a variety of physical
threats to the system that can be caused by unknown factors,
such as rain which affects the grip on a road, windy weather
that can affect vehicle movement etc. An issue can arise when
an attacker targets a specific sensor to disrupt its activity during
the learning process, as it will affect overall operation of the
vehicle at later operational stages. One of the examples would
be to disrupt a compass intentionally during learning so that
the robotic vehicle will learn the disrupted pattern as being
’normal’. We eliminate this risk by securing our vehicle from
attacks during the learning process.
Figure 3. Robotic vehicle testbed
To summarise, our robotic testbed vehicle has been de-
signed to facilitate a variety of experiments targeting differ-
ent data sources and identifying behavioural abnormalities.
Our goal is to develop a methodology that will improve
robustness of autonomous vehicles using a sensor-agnostic
learning approach where the type of data source does not
matter, as the requirement is to learn the “normal” signal
characteristics, including noise characteristics, generated by
the data sources. This robotic vehicle testbed has been built
to conduct experiments for a variety of navigational tasks
combined with robotic arm actuation. Additional sensors can
be added to extend evaluation of the behavioural model.
III. EXPERIMENT ENVIRONMENT
Initial experiments that were used for behaviour definition
are conducted in the Queen Mary Building at Greenwich
University. The environment provides an area with stochastic
elements for the data sources, such as old uneven stone flooring
with an irregular surface as can be seen in Figure 4. The space
is a controlled environment that will not change overtime.
The flooring has a variety of dents and lumps that affect the
testbed movement throughout the experiment and introduce a
stochastic randomness that is used to learn normal deviations.
The distance between walls is constant. This allows us to
identify the behavioural profile of an environment based on
the data source information. The corridor has a set of inset
door openings on either side which allows observation of
periodic behaviour in the ultrasonic distance sensor signals as
the vehicle passes by.
The corridor is 28 m long and the distance from wall to
wall is 2 m. The experiments were repeated five times to
ensure that the collected data set is representative and these
Figure 4. Experiment environment
were used for the creation of the behavioural profile. Two
further experiments were used for evaluation of the behavioural
profile. The behavioural profile is built using patterns of the
variation and background noise in data sources; mainly we
are looking at the spikiness of the data variations and the
variety of deviations. The experimental environment facilitates
repeatability and contains static elements that can be used as
guideline features during analysis of gained data, but it also
introduces significant stochastic elements which are essential
for understanding the normal levels of noise and variability in
sensor signals.
The experimental scenario evaluated in this paper is a
mission in which the robotic vehicle testbed has to reach the
end of the corridor using its own sensing capabilities. The
complexity of such a mission is not obvious. The uniqueness of
the flooring surface disrupts direction of the vehicle, forcing it
to continuously adapt the speed of its motors and its direction
and ensure that it maintains a safe distance from the walls
during operation. The scenario was chosen due to the structural
uniqueness of the vehicle, and as such the scenario exercises all
sensor capabilities. The experiment is organised in two steps.
The first is a training step, where over several runs we collect
a learning data set that will allow us to create a “normal”
behavioural profile. The second step is being conducted to
evaluate the recognition of “normal” behaviour profile, as
well as we evaluate the representational normality value of
a signature that was obtained during the learning step. This
value will be used to monitor normality at the higher level
observation, if an anomalous representational value has been
identified, the system will examine the amount of anomalies
and relationship between them, thus reducing computational
power requirement of the system.
IV. NORMAL BEHAVIOUR DEFINITION
Our behavioural model uses a sensor-independent ap-
proach, in the sense that the sensor-signal characterisation is
performed without any additional contextual information to
indicate the type of the sensor. Each different type of sensor has
its unique output, but we are not interested in determining the
type of the sensor, but instead we are interested in learning the
signal characteristics under normal operating conditions and
thus being able to automatically determine when an anomalous
condition occurs by monitoring data source signature.
A compass sensor provides a valuable example: due to
the limited speed at which the vehicle can turn, there is a
corresponding limit to the rate at which the compass bearing
can be expected to change. The compass bearing will also
contain a certain amount of noise as the vehicle travels over
non-perfect surfaces and does not track in a perfect straight line
(there is a detectable “wobble” of typically one to two degrees).
These characteristics can be learnt by examining the signal
over a series of test missions, without having to explicitly know
that the sensor is a compass. For simplicity, we demonstrate
the impact on the compass of a cyber-physical disruption
using a magnet-based sensory channel attack. By placing a
magnet in the vicinity of the sensor, we cause a variable
disruption of the vehicle’s navigational ability. By so doing,
the data stream from the sensor is affected in two detectable
ways. Firstly the sharp change in bearing when the magnet is
applied (or removed), and secondly, in the reduced noise levels
since the magnet causes the sensor to read near-static values
(which are anomalous because they are suspiciously “clean”).
The proposed approach enables attack detection without prior
knowledge of the attack type. The compass example is a part
of the experimental set used in our evaluation.
We represent the characteristics of sensor signals in a
signature format that can be used to compare expected and
actual behaviour in order to detect anomalous events. The
signature comprises a number of metrics whose values are
learnt during the mission experiments described earlier. The
metrics describe characteristics such as the signal-to-noise
levels, maximum and minimum sensor readings detected, size
and frequency of spike values and rate of change of sensor
values. The signature approach facilitates evaluation of the
enviroconsistency of a particular trace. For example, the system
may learn that a particular data source generates data values
distributed in the range 100 to 400 with a mean of 200 during
normal operation. The new trace can be compared against
the expected behaviour based on these specific characteristics.
There is no need to compare the raw data directly. The model
will determine whether a particular trace represents normal or
abnormal behaviour based on the distance between the trace
characteristics and the corresponding values in the signature.
TABLE II. SIGNATURE CHARACTERISTICS
Value Type Characteristic
Raw MinimumMaximum
Exponential Smoothing
Minimum
Maximum
Lowest Difference
Highest Difference
Deviation Standard Deviation
Spike Areas
50% - 100%
100% - 150%
150% - 200%
Over 200%
Our signature format contains various characteristics as
shown in Table II. Values are exponentially smoothed to
provide a basis for comparing instantaneous values with the
recent trend, thus detecting noise levels and abrupt changes in
values which are short lived are categorised as spikes. Such
concept has been used in a dynamic system in [18].
V. IDENTIFICATION OF ANOMALOUS SIGNALS AND
BEHAVIOUR
The signatures are constructed during the learning stage to
define normal behaviour on a per-sensor signal stream basis.
To capture the range of normal behaviour the experiments were
repeated five times to identify the domain of values where the
data sources operate and their normal deviations. Using such an
approach it is possible to classify normality when the system
operates within the normal experiment environment. Currently,
we evaluate the results of test runs off-line after each run,
however the learnt-signature based approach has the potential
to be used in real-time, for self-protection of the autonomous
vehicle. In this publication, we review multiple results from
seven experiments and different scenarios which are: learning
stage, evaluation stage, and physical-cyber compass attack
scenario.
To smooth data we are using exponential smoothing in our
model as it enables dynamic smoothing to be more reactive or
passive by changing the α value. It is a simple and efficient
means by which to follow an unfolding trend in sample values.
The technique if very efficient in regards to memory and
processing and so is well suited for use in embedded systems.
Each element of a signature comprises of characteristics that
may indicate an anomaly. An operational signature is applied
to a learnt “normal” signature, and this facilitates observation
of a data source anomalous behaviour and reasoning about
component behaviour at the higher layers of our software
stack and evaluate the deviations from normality. By observing
deviation coefficients (from the learnt normal characteristics),
we form a dynamic behaviour score for the data source.
The behavioural score (from the signature) can be used
to evaluate the level of threat to the system i.e. the higher the
deviation from the learnt normality, the higher the likelihood of
an attack. Table III shows an example analysis of data from a
compass bearing sensor. By comparing signature elements we
identify those elements which indicate that an attack might be
present. The deviation extents are weighted and combined to
determine the likelihood of an actual attack, i.e. co-deviation
on multiple elements reinforces the attack risk.
TABLE III. COMPASS BEARING BEHAVIOUR SIGNATURE DATA
Deviation Coefficient
Characteristic Value Learnt Test Attack
Min 167.8 0.0292 0.0148 0.4388(A)
Max 194.7 0.0151 0.0128 0.3180(A)
Exp. Min. 170.9 0.0145 0.0035 0.0995(A)
Exp. Max. 188.9 0.0083 0.0171(A) 0.3269(A)
Exp. Diff. Min. 0.0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Exp. Diff. Max. 10.1 0.2362 0.1289 >1.0000(A)
Std. Deviation. 5.3 0.1094 0.0582 >1.0000(A)
Spikes >50% 55 0.2435 0.3043(A) 0.9348(A)
Spikes >100% 25 0.5632 0.4079 0.8684(A)
Spikes >150% 10 0.5576 0.5455 0.8485(A)
Spikes >200% 5 0.4462 0.2308 0.6154(A)
Threat Summary 2.2231 1.7237 17.921
Table III shows the deviations from a variety of data sets
which are a Learning scenario, Test scenario and Compass
bearing attack scenario. By learning we mean that the vehicle
is operated in a series of known missions which exercise the
sensor signals across their normal value ranges. For example,
following the earlier discussion concerning the compass sensor,
the vehicle can be operated moving over various types of
surfaces to determine the levels of noise in the compass sensor
signal, and also can be made to turn at various angular rates-
of-change in compass sensor values.
By test scenario, we mean that the vehicle is operated (post
learning) in a variety of normal scenarios, with the objective of
testing the vehicle’s ability to detect the abnormalities solely
on the basis of finding anomalous conditions where the sensor
signals do not conform to expected learnt behaviour.
By attack scenario, we mean that the vehicle is operated
using the same conditions as in the learning and test scenarios,
but during the experiment we place the magnet near the
compass sensor for forty seconds. This is to validate the
behavioural profile approach and determine if the vehicle is
able to identify anomalous conditions.
To calculate the deviation coefficient reference for each
element in the signature, we have used results of five learning
stage experiments. The data set is normalised in the following
way, firstly for each signature characteristic the deviation of
its current value from the mean is calculated. This deviation
is then divided by the mean value of that corresponding
signature characteristic, the result is an absolute value. Then
the knowledge base is updated with the highest deviations
from all learning stage experiment data sets and forms the
“Learnt” knowledge which will be used as a reference for
anomaly detection. Test scenario is then compared to evaluate
the normality behavioural profile and identify the quantity
of allowed anomalies. To demonstrate the ability to identify
anomalous behaviour the data set of an “Attack” scenario was
used.
Figure 5. Compass bearing behaviour analysis
We detect an anomaly in terms of sensor signal values as a
situation where the signal deviates significantly from expected
(learnt) mean behaviour, as held in the particular sensor’s
signature. We investigate the automated detection of anomalies,
based on our signature approach using, initially a single sensor.
The corresponding data values are shown in Table III for one
data source using two different scenarios. The learnt behaviour
signature is based on running the identical normal scenario
experiment five times. The absolute value of the registered
maximums of all learning data sets is used as the anomaly
limit. To identify the number of acceptable anomalies we have
used our test scenario experiment runs. The data set from
these runs is evaluated in regards to the “Learnt” knowledge
to identify the amount of anomalies that exceed the learnt
threshold. This procedure has shown that two anomalies have
been observed and the threat summary score has not exceed
the learnt score, therefore these anomalies were classified as
acceptable.
The number of anomalies identifiable from an attack sce-
nario data are shown (A) in the Table III. The summary score
(behavioural score) is a sum of all deviation coefficients of
signature characteristics, and is used as an indicator of a threat
to the system. Such score explains the deviation of the data
source saying; the higher the score, the higher the deviation,
therefore the higher threat risk to the system. This is also
shown graphically in the Figure 5.
Initially all signature characteristics have equal weights,
and due to the weighing scheme we use, signature elements
are significantly out of line with expected values when an
attack occurs and so the robot is able to autonomously identify
an attack based on the detection of anomalies in the sensor
data using our methodology. At a level higher, if we will
take into account other data sources we can form a system
behavioural profile and identify if the system is exhibiting
normal or abnormal behaviour.
VI. EVALUATION
Earlier, we have demonstrated how a single data source
is analyzed producing the behavioural score that can be used
at the level higher for surface analysis of the data source. If
the behavioural score is exceeding the normality score, the
system will investigate the lower layer and will identify what
is the cause of such a high score. All system data source
signatures operate in the same data domain allowing the system
to produce a behavioural score by combining these signatures
together.
In this publication, we have reviewed a single data source
from multiple experiment scenarios. At the level higher obser-
vation, the system uses the overall behavioural score produced
by all available data sources. Such approach can decrease
the computational power requirement, however potentially
a situation can arise where multiple signature characteristic
readings are abnormal, but cancel each other out. Leading
to a threat summary score which does not indicate a threat.
This could mask an actual threat. This can be avoided by
an occasional low-level analysis and generating an interrupt-
based procedures when anomaly has been identified within the
signature.
As for the system’s final evaluation, it combines the threat
summary scores of all data sources to classify the behaviour
profile of a vehicle. The system has access to 17 instrumen-
tation channels from the internal components, which include
physical and cyber metrics, such as internal communication
utilisation, or sensing the physical environment such as a com-
pass bearing. For each data source a signature is automatically
generated. These signatures can be used in isolation or in
combination to determine the presence of anomalies and thus
determine the level of threat.
To summarize our experimental setup, we combine signa-
tures together to form a behavioural profile score of the system
which can represent level of threat to the system during a
mission. All data sources have equal weights when combined
together producing a sum of all available data source signature
scores. For current experimental setup that is reviewed in
this publication, we have learnt that the overall behavioural
score from the learning scenarios was 46.323. This score has
been produced by a combination of signature summary scores
from all available data sources during the learning stage. In
this we publication, the key aspect was made to demonstrate
the conceptual idea of a data source signature approach and
it would be thoroughly explained, therefore the higher level
of anomaly detection approach will be investigated further
and published in the future. The test scenario produced a
score of 54.237, we can notice that the score for the test
scenario is higher than the “Learnt” behavioural score which
was learnt using the learning scenarios, through a thorough
investigation of the results we have identified that the amount
of allowed anomalies has not been exceeded, and overall higher
behavioural score was produced by accumulated anomalies that
were classified as allowed, resulting in a higher behavioural
score. The attack scenario has produced a score of 113.6568,
which is considerably higher than the score produced by the
learnt and test scenarios. This shows that the deviations from
normality were highly exceeding the threshold allowance on
multiple data source signatures.
Further improvements have to be made to increase robust-
ness of the described methodology. Currently, we are using
sensor characteristic weights that are equally distributed, thus
affecting an overall threat score of a sensor and system itself.
Also to make system more robust it would be necessary
to investigate how correlation affects an overall behaviour
score, as some data sources may have dependencies and
these dependencies would result in an anomalous accumulative
behaviour score that was described earlier. Weighing system
has to be enhanced on a data source and signature characteristic
level. One of the solutions is the examination of the spikiness
level that can be used to implement dynamic weighing. One
of the examples would be that the values from a sensor that
are continually volatile (e.g., an accelerometer reading when
travelling over a bumpy surface). In such cases, a lower weight
would be assigned to the particular sensor characteristic or a
signature characteristic. In this way the system can adapt to
changing environmental contexts. It is less sensitive to noise
or spikes when the ambient noise level or spike frequency is
higher.
VII. CONCLUSION
The work presented here forms part of a wider project
to develop techniques for autonomous systems to self-detect
attacks. In this paper we have presented a sensor-agnostic
learning technique in which a set of sensor-signal charac-
teristics are collectively represented in a signature for each
particular sensor. In terms of detecting attacks, the system
need not know the type of the sensor, but instead looks at
characteristics such as the typical noise levels, the range of
data values, the rate of change of data values, the occurrence
of spike values, etc.
The initial signatures are generated in experimental mission
scenarios but in the absence of attacks, the data signals from
sensors are therefore realistic in terms of data values, noise
levels, etc. An attack is subsequently detected by observing
significant deviations in one or more signature elements for a
specific sensor or across several sensors. This approach lends
itself to dynamic adaptation which enables the anomaly detec-
tion thresholds to be adjusted in line with the environmental
volatility, although to date, we have only addressed this step
at the concept level (using static signatures for detection).
The main strengths of our approach are that it can be
applied universally across a wide range of sensor types without
needing manual configuration and that multiple signatures
can be used to enhance the attack discrimination accuracy
(facilitated by the standardised signature representation). In
addition it has the potential to operate in a continuous learning
mode in which it will adapt to its environmental conditions
over short to medium time spans, but it will always be sensitive
to abrupt changes.
We have developed a custom testbed vehicle in order to
evaluate the approach. The experimental method and some
initial results are presented above and illustrate how the
vehicle was able to successfully identify anomalous events
which were part of an attack. Our current findings are very
encouraging. Due to the weighting scheme we use, the effects
of significant differences between expected and actual sensor
data are amplified and thus we have achieved a high true-
positive rate and simultaneously a low false-positive rate.
The current implementation requires a training phase, dur-
ing which it builds up behavioural signatures based on the
sensed data signals. These signatures then form the basis on
which reasoning is performed at several layers in our software
stack. The first layer is concerned with anomaly detection at
the level of a sensor, whereas at higher levels it is possible to
gain a picture of the attack status across the entire vehicle.
Further work includes dynamic adjustment of the anomaly
threshold, as discussed above with the intention of removing
the need to retrain the vehicle for use in different environments,
as well as further evaluation on the training algorithm itself to
understand the optimal level of training and to avoid over-
training or under-training issues.
Our cyber-security approach is to consider the robotic
system from the perspective that the system initially has no
knowledge about itself i.e. a box-in-a-box concept where the
perception of the robotic system is stored in a box with several
doors and the outer box represents the operating environment.
The robotic system only observes values coming in or out and
is not able to directly observe the true outside environment.
In such a case the robotic system’s perception has to make
sense to itself, without knowing what is outside and is entirely
based on sensor data and patterns within. In such a scenario
the autonomous system is sensitive to manipulated sensor
data and therefore the signature based approach has been
devised specifically to facilitate discrimination between normal
and abnormal situations, using a combination of learnt mean
behaviour, current data signals and trends in data signals.
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